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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW
During the 1978-1979 survey period, there was a significant increase in
the number of labor cases handled by the Tenth Circuit. This overview will
provide a brief summary of those cases which have been selected for official
publication.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT1
A. Interference with Union Activities: The Organizational Campai n
In NLRB v. Nationaljewish Hospital & Research Center,2 the Tenth Circuit
upheld an order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) directing
that the hospital cease and desist the promulgation of an overly broad no-
solicitation rule.3 The rule, which prohibited employee solicitation on be-
half of labor organizations in areas of the hospital accessible to patients, was
defended on the basis of the hospital's interest in patient tranquility.
In order to bring its view into harmony with a recent Supreme Court
decision, 4 the court was compelled to substantially revise its own contrary
precedent; in St. John's Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB,5 the Tenth
Circuit had found that the Board lacked the expertise necessary to determine
whether solicitation might have a disturbing effect upon patient health.
In NLRBv. Beth Israel Hospital,6 the Supreme Court held that strict rules
against solicitation could be applied only to immediate patient care areas.
To determine whether solicitation would be permissable in other areas of the
hospital, the Board was required to balance the likelihood of the disruption
of patient care against the organizational rights of the employees.
7
In light of Beth Israel, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the mere possibil-
ity of patient disturbance was insufficient to justify the prohibition of solici-
tation. The court held that the burden was on the employer to show positive
evidence of a disruptive effect, and that this burden had not been met.8
Again addressing a no-solicitation situation, the court of appeals in
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).
2. 593 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1978).
3. Absent special circumstances, unreasonable interference with union solicitation is pre-
sumptively an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Beth Israel Hospital, 437 U.S. 483, 493 (1978).
However, the Board itself has recognized that hospitals have special needs which justify a modi-
fication of the general rule. See St. John's Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc. v. Laborers' Int'l
Union of North America, 222 NLRB 1150 (1976).
4. NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
5. 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977). In St. John's, the Tenth Circuit permitted a ban on
solicitation in all areas of the hospital to which patients had access.
6. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
7. Id. at 505-07.
8. 593 F.2d at 913.
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NLRB v. St. Joseph Hospital9 determined that there was no legitimate evi-
dence of such special circumstances'0 as might justify a ban on union solici-
tation and distribution in the hospital cafeteria and parking lot. The court
noted that the hospital relied solely on conclusory statements made by an
administrator that the rule was necessary to prevent the disruption of patient
care activities. Such general statements were held not to represent positive
evidence of a harmful effect such as was required in Beth Israel.
The Tenth Circuit, however, refused to issue broad guidelines applying
to union solicitation in hospitals generally. Instead, it remanded the cause to
the Board to define the immediate patient care areas in which solicitation
can be strictly prohibited. I I
In NLRB v. Presbyterian Medical Center,12 the Tenth Circuit applied Beth
Israel to a no-access rule and found that it also violated employee rights.
The rule in question prohibited employees from being on hospital premises
except during working hours or while in attendance at authorized, hospital
functions. As justification, the employer gave reasons of security, limited
parking space, abuse of overtime, and interference with productivity.'3
The appellate court emphasized that business-related factors were insuf-
ficient to justify a no-access rule (or a no-distribution, no-solicitation rule).
Justifications must be based upon the necessity to "avoid disruption of
health-care operations or disturbance of patients."'1 4 Inasmuch as the prof-
fered justifications did not meet this test, the Board ruling was upheld.
At issue in HeadDivision, 4MF, Inc. v. NLRB' 5 was a charge of unlawful
discrimination in the enforcement of a company no-distribution rule. Head
maintained that where the rule was consistently enforced against every em-
ployee, no unlawful discrimination existed when the employer itself engaged
in distribution. 16
The Tenth Circuit cited NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America1 7 for the
narrow proposition that distribution by the company can be equated only
with distribution by supervisory personnel.' 8 Reasoning that a leadman was
an employee rather than a supervisor, '9 the court upheld the Board determi-
nation that the rule had been unlawfully enforced against some employees
but not against others. The fact that distribution was made at the request of
an agent of the company was discounted as immaterial.
9. 587 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1978).
10. See note 3 supra.
11. 587 F.2d at 1065. The Board's order was deemed too vague and overbroad to be en-
forced.
12. 586 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1978).
13. Id at 167.
14. Id at 168.
15. 593 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1979). The rule provided against " 'circulation or distribution
of written material in working areas or on working time.'" Id at 976 (quoting the opinion of
the Administrative Law Judge, 228 NLRB No. 180 (1977)).
16. 593 F.2d at 977 (citing NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1958)).
17. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
18. 593 F.2d at 978.




In addition, the court of appeals found that this and other unfair labor
practices constituted an "operative part" of an ensuing strike. Even though
the union had not raised the unfair practices issue during negotiations, suffi-
cient evidence supported the trial court determination that a contract dis-
pute was not the sole cause of the strike.
20
Plasttcrals, Znc. v. NLRB2 ' is notable chiefly for a comprehensive discus-
sion of the standards to be applied in determining whether there has been a
violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) where wage increases
have been granted or withheld during periods of critical union activity. The
NLRB found that Plasticrafts had violated the neutrality of a union election
when it suspended all wage increases for the duration of the campaign. Plas-
ticrafts appealed, arguing that unlawful anti-union animus must be shown
in order to establish a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 22 and protesting
the fact that the Board had failed to hear proffered testimony.
The Tenth Circuit refused to follow those cases which might be con-
strued to require a finding of anti-union motive in every 8(a)(1) case, and
upheld the general rule: Where there exists a clearly apparent status quo
with respect to wage increases, any change in that practice in response to
protected union activity constitutes a violation, regardless of motive.2 3 Since
no anti-union animus need be shown, the court further held that it was not
error that the Board refused to hear company testimony regarding motive.
Were the status quo not "clearly apparent" to the employer, motive would
become important. The Tenth Circuit also rejected Plasticrafts' contention
that the Board must show some change in employee behavior attributable to
the incident.
24
The underlying question in Kustom Electronzcs, Inc. v. NLRB 25 was
whether the Board had erred in finding that employees who had been laid
off six months prior to a union election were nonetheless eligible to vote in
that election. The case arose from an NLRB holding that the company had
committed an unfair labor practice26 when it refused to bargain with a re-
cently certified union. Kustom, in defense of its action, argued that the
union was improperly certified in that it did not represent a majority of
employees eligible to vote.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Board that the proper test for a
determination of eligibility to vote is whether laid off employees had, at the
time of the election, a "reasonable expectation of replacement within a rea-
20. 593 F.2d at 981. "In determining whether a strike is an unfair labor practices strike,
the NLRB is not limited to a consideration of what the Union stated at negotiation sessions or
in public. The perspective of the striking employees may properly be deemed of controlling
significance." Id at 981 n.18.
21. 586 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1978).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization and
other concerted activities.
23. 586 F.2d at 188. The court emphasized that the practice must not only be an estab-
lished one, but must also be "clearly apparent to an objectively reasonable employer." Id
24. 586 F.2d at 190. The violation occurs when employer conduct t&nd to be coercive,
whether or not individual employees are successfully coerced.
25. 590 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1978).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5) (1976).
1980]
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sonable time in the future."'2 7 That employees may have been told when
laid off that the dismissal would be permanent was held not determinative,
since it was their understanding at the time of the election that counted. In
particular, the court found that the Board's refusal to entertain the union's
unfair labor practice charges stemming from the layoffs did not ipso facto
establish that employees could not reasonably expect to be recalled. Rather,
the issue was held to be but one of the many to be considered by the Board
in making its factual determination.
28
B. Refusal to Bargain
29
In NLRB v. Albion Corp. ,30 the Tenth Circuit upheld a Board decision
that the company had violated section 8(a)(5)31 of the NLRA by refusing to
recognize and bargain with the union. The court found that even though
outright refusal to bargain had lasted but five days, the timing of the refusal
being coincident with a threatened strike, combined with company conduct
prior to that time, was sufficient to constitute a "continuous course of con-
duct"'32 in violation of the Act.
Although evidence was sparse, 33 the court further upheld a Board de-
termination that an ensuring strike was caused, at least in part, by Albion's
refusal to bargain. 34 The Tenth Circuit thus concluded that unlawful terms
had been imposed as a condition of reinstatement for striking employees.
The company had presented a strong case to show that the conditions were
the product of sound business judgment, 35 but the court held as controlling
its decision in NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp. 3 6 that "[s]triking employees
are upon request entitled to reinstatement if unfair labor practices are the
cause or one of the operative causes of their strike."
'3 7
Because new evidence was proffered having bearing upon the question
of Albion's good faith and financial plight, the order was partially remanded
for further proceedings with respect to liability.
In NLRB v. Ethan A//en, Inc. ,38 the court of appeals was asked to enforce
an order requiring that the employer recognize and bargain with a duly
27. 590 F.2d at 821 (citing Marlin-Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 586, 588 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 594 (1941); NLRB v. Hondo Drilling Co., 428 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Jesse Jones Sausage Co., 309 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1962)).
28. 590 F.2d at 822.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1976).
30. 593 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
32. See Machinists Local v. Labor Board, 362 U.S. 411, 416 (1959).
33. Evidence that the strike was motivated by the refusal to bargain consisted primarily of
a statement by a union steward to employees shortly before the strike vote that "we have no new
contract and none had been discussed." 593 F.2d at 940. From this, the Tenth Circuit inferred
that employees were aware of the company refusal to bargain. Id
34. There appears to be an inconsistency in the court's reasoning. It is difficult to see how
a refusal to bargain can both cause a strike and be caused by it.
35. The employer gave the following reasons for restrictions on the employees' return to
work: the company's financial plight, a show of potential violence on the picket line, and sabo-
tage which had previously occurred. 593 F.2d at 943.
36. 277 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960).
37. Id at 584.
38. 596 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 5 7:2
LABOR LAW
certified union. Ethan Allen had based its refusal to bargain on allegations
that the union election was invalid, having been tainted by pro-union con-
duct on the part of supervisory personnel. The Board, adopting the report of
its director, had rejected the allegations and entered summary judgment for
the union. The issue presented to the Tenth Circuit was whether the Board
need hold an evidentiary hearing prior to the adoption of a regional direc-
tor's report requiring an employer to recognize and bargain with a union.
In upholding the Board, the court observed that the only exception
which had been timely filed was couched in such general terms as to raise no
real issue of fact. Unless exceptions raise serious and substantial issues, no
evidentiary hearing need be held.
39
In W & WSteel Co. v. NLRB,40 the Tenth Circuit refused to enforce a
Board order which held that the company was a "successor employer" 4 1 for
bargaining purposes, and which granted W & W's request for a decertifica-
tion election. In its resolution of the issue, the court determined that the
successor employer relationship did not exist where the employer could show
a rational basis in fact for its doubts about union majority status.
Analyzing NLRB v. Bums International Security Services, Inc. 42 vis-a-vis the
facts before it, the court found substantial evidence to support a doubt of
union majority status at the time the plant was acquired. Special stress was
laid upon the fact that the unit election had been held more than two and
one half years prior to the takeover. Under such conditions, the court ob-
served, the plant did not constitute an " 'unchanged bargaining unit'" rep-
resented by a " 'recently certified bargaining agent' " as was required in
Burns.
4 3
The court's analysis emphasized that a rational factual basis must exist
in order to support a doubt of union majority status. There was no elabora-
tion of the standards applicable to a determination that the doubt was in
"good faith," but the Tenth Circuit seemed to imply that once the factual
basis had been demonstrated, it would be up to the Board to show lack of a
good faith doubt.
C. Interference with Union Activities
Timpte, Inc. v. NLRB 44 involved a distribution problem of a different
type. Timpte had dismissed an employee for his refusal to abide by com-
pany directives that he refrain from using profanity and indecent language
in the literature he handed out as part of his campaign for union office. The
NLRB directed that the employee be reinstated, and held that where the
matter concerned legitimate union-related business, the company had no
right to control even " 'vulgar language, insults directed against manage-
39. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(l) (1978).
40. 599 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
41. Where the successor employee relationship exists, there are continuing obligations
under the collective bargaining agreement so long as the certification remains valid. NLRB v.
Geronimo Services Co., 467 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1972).
42. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
43. 599 F.2d at 939.
44. 590 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1979).
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ment and inflammatory appeals.' "45
Section 7 of the NLRA states that employees shall have the right to
engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of. . . mutual aid or protec-
tion."'46 Section 8(a)(1) makes it a violation for an employer to "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section [7] .... .47 Discussing concerted activities in general, the court
characterized all concerted activities as " 'protected unless unlawful, violent,
in breach of contract, or indefensible.' "48 The Tenth Circuit found gener-
ous support in the opinions of other federal district courts for its charactriza-
tion of the employee's activities as "indefensible. '49 Since the activity was
not protected under the NLRA, the court denied enforcement of the Board
order.
In Chmax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB,50 the employer petitioned for review
of a Board decision that it had violated the Act 5' by refusing to allow a
union representative to consult with an employee on company time prior to
an investigatory interview which might culminate in discipline of the em-
ployee. Both Climax and the NLRB relied on NLRB v. J Weingarten, Inc. ,52
a recent Supreme Court decision holding that denial of representation dur-
ing such an investigatory interview was a violation of an employee's right to
engage in concerted activities.
The Tenth Circuit, maintaining that investigation should not be adver-
sary in nature, refused to enlarge the Weingarten decision. The court con-
cluded that prior consultation might interfere with legitimate company
interests. The evidence presented conclusively demonstrated that union offi-
cials had urged employees not to provide needed information. 53 Such a pol-
icy could be particularly devastating where safety is a major concern, as it is
at Climax.
In addition, the court noted that none of the employees had requested
representation during the investigation. To insist that an employer donate
company time when employees chose not to consult representatives on their
own time was adjudged to place an unfair burden on the employer. Of
course, the court added, the company must set the interview date so as to
allow sufficient time for prior consultation on the employee's own time
should he so desire.54
NLRB v. Process & Pollution Control Co. 55 involved a Board order di-
45. Id. at 873 (quoting the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
47. Id. § 158(a)(1).
48. 590 F.2d at 874 (quoting NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977)).
49. NLRB v. Garner Tool & Die Mfg., Inc., 493 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Fibers
Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311 (1st Cir. 1971); Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965); Maryland Drydock Co. v.
NLRB, 183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950).
50. 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1976).
52. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
53. 584 F.2d at 363-64.
54. In dicta, the court observed that the right to union representation at the interview itself
exists only if the involved employee requests representation. Id at 365.
55. 588 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 57:2
LABOR LAW
recting that the company hire, with back pay, a job applicant allegedly re-
fused employment because of union activities. The Board further directed
the company to cease from interfering with the exercise of the self-organiza-
tional rights of its employees. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected com-
pany allegations that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence
and limited itself to a consideration of evidentiary matters.
The company charged that the Board had erred when it refused to con-
sider evidence which showed previous hiring of persons believed to be union
members. The court agreed since anti-union animus was a basic considera-
tion in the decision and had been established only by circumstancial evi-
dence. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that any evidence which might tend to
show an employer's course of conduct with respect to unions would be useful
to the assessment of intent. "Bona fide beliefs held by a person, as well as his
actual knowledge, are relevant in determining his intentions and motiviation
for his actions."
'56
In addition, the court upheld a company objection to the admission of
certain hearsay. Although recognizing that the rules of hearsay are less rig-
orously imposed upon the NLRB than upon courts, the Tenth Circuit main-
tained that they must be applied unless circumstances make their observance
"impracticable.
57
D. Union Hiring Halls
Neither the law nor court decisions forbid hiring halls operated by the
union, so long as they are not operated so as to discriminate against nonun-
ion members.
In NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 322,53 the
Board found unfair labor practices where the union and the employer oper-
ated a hiring hall in a manner which effectively denied access to nonunion
job applicants. Through a contractual arrangement, job applicants were re-
quired to register at the hall in order to obtain employment. While the
union-operated hall was not the exclusive method through which the com-
pany could get employees, applicants hired "at the gate" were employed
only temporarily and were subject to discharge when qualified applicants
became available through the referral system.
The Tenth Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board
charge of discrimination. During a period in which the company was admit-
tedly in need of employees, nonunion job applicants were turned away from
the hiring hall with a statement that no work was available. The facts indi-
cated that with few exceptions, all union members were referred for employ-
ment while only three out of a total of 175 nonmember applicants received
56. Id at 790. The court further addressed the breadth and scope of the Board order,
directing that should a violation be found on remand, the order should be modified so as to
limit prohibitions to violations similar to the one found. Id
57. Id at 791. The court found no showing that it would have been difficult to have the
witness appear in person rather than receive her testimony second-hand.
58. 597 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1979).
1980]
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referrals.59 Finding the discriminatory acts of the union chargeable to the
employer, the Tenth Circuit held that both were in violation of the Act.
6 °
Additionally, the court took note of a pattern of discrimination and required
that the parties take affirmative action in order to provide equal access to the
hiring hall.
In Robertson v. NLRB, 6 1 the court of appeals addressed the legality of a
contractual provision which required, inter a/ia, that a job applicant previ-
ously have worked for a unionized employer in order to secure preference in
employment opportunity. The primary issue in the case involved a statutory
construction of section 8(0(4)62 of the NLRA, which the Board had read as
permitting the contractual provision.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Board's analysis. It pointed out that the
precise language of the statute permits only the use of objective criteria in a
job referral system. Thus, a hiring hall could condition referrals upon the
training of applicants, or even upon length of service with the immediate
employer. The court determined, however, that priority based upon prior
employment with any company party to a union agreement was implicitly
discriminatory.
The Tenth Circuit further recognized that while preference in referral
could theoretically be secured without having been a union member,63 the
hiring hall provision could foreseeably exert pressure upon nonunion appli-
cants to join. Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right not only to
bargain collectively, but also to refrain from so doing.64 The court con-
cluded that upholding the contractual provision would penalize those appli-
cants who chose to exercise that statutory right.
E. Union Duty of Fair Representation
In Bell v. IML Freight, Inc. ,65 the Tenth Circuit significantly relaxed the
criteria which govern an individual union member's right to challenge the
jurisdiction of a committee created by a collective bargaining agreement.
The dispute arose out of a company decision to integrate a dual seniority
system into a single list. In adherence to the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the matter was submitted to a joint employer-union commit-
tee which then approved the proposed change. Bell, alleging a loss of
seniority due to the change, filed suit under section 30166 of the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act, claiming that the committee had exceeded its au-
thority under the collective agreement.
59. Id at 1328 n.4. The three nonmembers who received referrals were found to have
specific qualifications which may have accounted for the exception made in their case.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(l)(A), (b)(2) (1976).
61. 597 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1979).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0(4) (1976).
63. The contract provision in question did not require that the employee, in order to have
preference, have been a union member, but only that he have worked for an employer who had
a collective agreement with the union.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
65. 589 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1979).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
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The Tenth Circuit places great reliance upon the rule governing arbi-
tration awards as providing a guideline to determine standing in actions
which challenge the jurisdiction of contract-created committees. 6 7 "The
general rule is that a fairly represented employee may not attack an arbitra-
tion decision made in the context of a collective bargaining agreement. '68
The court of appeals, however, rejected unfairness of representation as a
prerequisite to judicial review in situations where the union is placed in a
position of having to support the rights of one group of employees over those
of another. In so doing, it called attention to a Third Circuit decision
69
which had recognized, in a different context, the inadequacy of union repre-
sentation of two groups with conflicting interests. The court there had
granted standing because of inadequate representation. The Tenth Circuit
agreed with this view. Reasoning that the affected employees would other-
wise be left without a remedy, the court granted them the right to present
their position.
Firer v. Safeway Sores, Inc. 70 arose as an appeal under the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act 7' from an arbitration decision. Fizer challenged the
validity of the decision, claiming that Safeway had wrongfully discharged
him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. He further claimed
that the union had breached its duty to fairly represent him during the arbi-
tration proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for both
defendants.
In upholding summary judgment for the union, the court of appeals
reaffirmed its policy against interference in internal union affairs72 and
noted that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust internal remedies as required
by the union constitution. Indeed, the plaintiff had made no official ap-
proach at all to the union. 73 Vague allegations of union indifference were
held insufficient to show that such efforts would have been useless. The
Tenth Circuit stated that the plaintiffs claims failed to meet the " 'clear and
positive showing of futility' " standard 74 which governs in attempts to cir-
cumvent exhaustion requirements.
On the other hand, the court rejected summary judgment for Safeway,
maintaining that failure to exhaust union remedies could not be urged by
the employer as a defense in a suit for wrongful discharge.
75
67. 589 F.2d at 504.
68. Id (citing Andrus v. Convoy Co., 480 F.2d 604, 606 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 989
(1973)).
69. Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
70. 586 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1978).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
72. 586 F.2d at 184 (citing Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 915 (1973)).
73. 586 F.2d at 184.
74. Id. at 183 (quoting Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1973).
75. Exhaustion of union remedy can be used by the employer as a defense in some situa-




Fabricut, Inc. v. Tulsa General Drivers76 involved a company appeal from
the district court's affirmation of an arbitration award. Pursuant to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, a dispute involving an employee's discharge for
refusal to work overtime was submitted to arbitration. Finding that the
company did not have just cause for the dismissal, the arbitrator reduced the
penalty to a one month suspension, and directed reinstatement of the em-
ployee. Fabricut then sued to set aside the award, asserting that the arbitra-
tor had exceeded his contractual authority.
Although the merits of an arbitration award are generally beyond judi-
cial review, 77 courts will not uphold an arbitration decision where it can be
shown that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority under the collective
bargaining agreement. 78 The question faced by the Tenth Circuit was
whether that authority had been abused where, in considering a contract
violation with no stated penalty, the arbitrator substituted his own penalty
for the one previously imposed by the employer.
In deciding that the arbitrator acted within the bounds of his authority,
the Tenth Circuit applied principles which it had earlier adopted. 79 In par-
ticular, the award may not be contrary to the express language of the agree-
ment and must have rational support.80 The court felt that this test had
been met. An analysis of the various contract provisions showed none which
mandated discharge as a penalty. Nor was the contract found to give the
employer discretion to choose a penalty when none was authorized. Ra-
tional support for the decision was inferred from "the entire agreement, its
context, and intent."81 In the opinion of the court, the arbitrator, rather
than changing the contract, was making it workable.
G. Board Remedies
Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB8 2 arose as a challenge to a Board
decision finding that the company had discharged an employee in violation
of the Act8 3 and requiring that the employee be reinstated with back pay.
Dayton did not deny the violation, but argued that the remedy was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. In particular, the employer charged that
findings of 27.5% permanent partial disability in the employee by the State
Industrial Court relieved it of any obligation to reinstate.
84
The court ruled that Board findings control on issues before it, even
76. 597 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1979).
77. Id at 229.
78. The standards of review applicable to arbitration decisions were set out by the
Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960). "[The arbitrator] does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice ....
[H]is award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." Id at 597.
79. Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Motor Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1977).
80. Id at 694.
81. 597 F.2d at 230.
82. 591 F.2d 566 (10th Cir. 1979).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1976).
84. 591 F.2d at 569.
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where the findings of a state agency are inconsistent. 85 It observed, however,
that in the instant case the issues before the Board differed from those
presented to the State Industrial Court. Ample evidence supported the
Board in its determination that, despite the findings of the Industrial Court,
the employee was capable of performing his job. Citing a strong policy
favoring limited review of Board decisions, the court upheld the remedy im-
posed.
In addition, the Tenth Circuit examined the procedures used by the
Board to determine an award of back pay. The court commended the usual
NLRB practice which utilizes a two-step process in unlawful discharge cases.
Initially, the Board determines whether an unfair practice has been commit-
ted, and if it has, whether reinstatement with back pay is an appropriate
remedy. The second step involves a hearing on the amount to be awarded,
preceded by notice to the affected parties. Such notice provides the em-
ployer with an opportunity to present evidence which might affect his liabil-
ity. Finding that these safeguards had not been observed in the hearing
being reviewed, the court refused to honor the award.
H. Employee Benefit Trust Funds
In Denver Metropolitan Association v. Journeyman Plumbers,86 the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided several issues which will have a significant bearing upon the
future development of industry-wide employee benefit trusts. An employers'
association brought an action challenging contributions made to various
funds by employers who were not members of the association. In its action,
the association alleged that the union and fund trustees had violated the
collective agreement as well as certain statutory provisions8 7 in their admin-
istration of the trust funds. The district court entered summary judgment
for the defendants on the issue of contract violation and held that the associ-
ation lacked standing to challenge alleged statutory violations.
Examining first the contractual claim, the court of appeals applied the
usual principles of contract interpretation to determine the intent of the par-
ties. The court found that the language of the various agreements clearly
and unequivocally demonstrated a contemplation that nonassociation mem-
bers be allowed to adopt the agreement. 88 Prior bargaining history, past
practices, and the nature of the industry were cited as further support for the
court's determination.
After deciding that the association had standing,89 the Tenth Circuit
85. Id at 570 (citing NLRB v. Western Meat Packers, Inc., 368 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Stafford Trucking, Inc., 371 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1966); 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976)).
86. 586 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1978).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
88. 586 F.2d at 1370. The association had argued that a third party cannot be added to a
contract without the agreement of both original parties. The Tenth Circuit agreed, but re-
minded the association that consent can be given in advance.
89. The Tenth Circuit overruled the district court's contention that the association was not
within the "zone of interest to be protected by the statute." Association of Data Processing
Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The court reasoned that since the association
was a party to the trust agreements involved and had the ability to name the employer trustees,
it had sufficient interest to meet the test. 586 F.2d at 1372.
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considered association arguments that nonmember employer contributions
violated statutory requirements that nonmember employer contributions vi-
olated statutory requirements that "payments are to be made as specified in
a written agreement," and that "employees and employers [be] equally rep-
resented" in fund administration.90 The court called attention to the writ-
ten provisions in collective agreements between the unions and outsiders
which require contribution to the trusts and held that these, through incor-
poration, met the written agreement test. The Tenth Circuit disposed of the
equal representation argument with comparable facility. Rejecting em-
ployer interpretation that the statute requires equal representation by each
employer, the court construed it to mean only that representation of employ-
ees equal that of employers.
91
The Tenth Circuit noted a remote possibility of abuse of the arrange-
ment by a strong union, but concluded that this possibility was outweighed
by the benefits of the industry-wide trust.
II. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
9 2
In Schwager v. Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania,9 3 the Tenth Circuit provided a
comprehensive discussion of the guidelines and standards to be used in estab-
lishing a prima facie case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).94 The plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, brought an
action alleging unlawful discharge because of his age. The company de-
fended its action on the basis of economic considerations which necessitated
an overall company reorganization.
Stating that the purpose and structure of the ADEA is similar to that of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,95 the Tenth Circuit applied the guidelines
laid down in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.96 It determined that under the
Supreme Court standards, the plaintiff had established a prima facie case,
thus shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to show a nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the dismissal. In the court's opinion, this burden had been
met. The court found ample evidence to support district court findings that
the discharge was motivated by legitimate factors other than age.
In Kentroliv. Frontier Airlines, Inc. ,97 the court again addressed itself to
the procedure to be used, in establishing age discrimination under the
ADEA. The plaintiff appealed from a trial court dismissal of his suit for
90. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
91. 586 F.2d at 1374-75.
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
93. 591 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1976).
96. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that "(1)
he or she is within the protected age group; (2) he or she was doing satisfactory work; (3) he or
she was discharged despite the adequacy of his or her work; and (4) the position was filled by
employees younger than the age of the plaintiff." 591 F.2d at 61.
97. 585 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1978).
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wrongful discharge because of age. He claimed procedural error in that the
trial judge, granting a defense motion to dismiss for failure to establish a
prima facie case, considered evidence presented by the defense.
The Tenth Circuit sensibly refused to find prejudice, even though in so
doing it was forced to modify its own contrary precedent. 98 "We do not,"
stated the court, "believe it critical here to determine which process of rea-
soning the trial court followed-rejecting the plaintiffs case because of [sic]
prz'mafacte showing had not been made, or holding that the defendant pre-
vailed because the evidence demonstrated legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for the defendant's actions."
99
In Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania,'00 the court focused its atten-
tion on the statutory requirement that, whenever possible, the ADEA be
enforced through a process of conciliation and voluntary compliance.' 0 '
The Secretary of Labor had filed an enforcement suit, alleging age discrimi-
nation against seven former employees of Sun Oil. The district court dis-
missed, holding that the plaintiffs insistence on a waiver of the statute of
limitations as a condition to further efforts at negotiation violated the intent
of the ADEA.
The court of appeals, agreeing that the defendant was under no obliga-
tion to waive the statute of limitations, recognized that the Act mandated a
complete exploration of all avenues of informal compliance before the insti-
tution of court action. 0 2 In the opinion of the court, however, outright dis-
missal conflicted with the humanitarian purposes of the Act. The Tenth
Circuit ordered the matter stayed pending further conciliation efforts.
III. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
10 3
The sole question addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Tripper v. Smith 1
0 4
was whether an employee benefit plan, which was terminated prior to the
effective dates of the Act, was covered by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).10 5 The plaintiff argued that while termination of the
plan occurred prior to the effective dates, distribution proceedings under-
taken by the trustees subsequent to that time brought the plan within ER-
ISA.
The Tenth Circuit could not agree with the plaintiffs broad construc-
tion of the Act. In the court's opinion, neither congressional intent nor the
wording of ERISA made it applicable to a plan which has not continued in
98. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (lOth Cir. 1975). In Rih, it was held that
only after a preliminary determination that a prima facie case existed should the trial court
admit the defendant's evidence.
99. 585 F.2d at 970.
100. 592 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1979).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
102. Comparing age discrimination to racial discrimination, the court cited EEOC v. Zia
Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978) for the proposition that a good faith effort on the part of the
Secretary to effect compliance is a prerequisite to a stay order.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
104. 592 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir.. 1979).
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
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existence as an "operating" plan. The court held that a "terminated plan
the corpus of which is in the process of liquidation before the effective dates
in ERISA is not a 'plan' as contemplated in the Act."'
10 6
L}'nne McGowan
106. 592 F.2d at 1113.
[Vol. 57:2
